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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DON S. SMITH and BRIGHAM H.
SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
-vsR. L. WARR,
Defendant and Crosscomplainant and
Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 14565

J. EL. EHLERS, EVELYN P.
BOYCE, LOIS P. CONNELL,
Defendants and Crossdefendants and Respondents •

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a judgment in his favor
and against respondents based on a breach of two real
estate contracts.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's cross complaint against
was* t r i e d w i t h o u t

jury before

respondents

t h e H o n o r a b l e James S .

Sawaya on January 16, 19 76 at which time the lower
court held in favor of appellant but limited recovery
to appellant's out-of-pocket loss and denied appellant's
request for attorney's fees and costs of court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an increase in the judgment
by using as the measure of damages the benefit of the
bargain rule or, in the alternative, the true
paid by appellant to respondents.

amount

In addition appellant

seeks a reversal of the lower court's order denying
attorney's fees and court costs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The property in question was acquired by tax
deed dated June 6, 19 49 by Rermold Pender and respondent
J. H. Ehlers.

Mr. Pender died in 1963 and his estate,

including the property in question, was distributed to
his two daughters, respondents Evelyn P. Boyce and Lois
P. Connell, pursuant to a Decree of Distribution dated
November 29, 1966.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law supporting the Judgment entered for plaintiffs
below.)
Mr. Boyce, the husband of respondent Boyce,
acted as the agent for respondents Boyce and Connell in
administering the estate of Mr. Pender from the time of
his death in 1963 to the closing of the estate in 1966.
-2-

(Tr. p. 37.)

This included the duty to pay the taxes

on all the property in the estate, including the property
in question.

(Tr. p. 39.)

On August 20, 19 73 appellant purchased from all
these respondents by virtue of two Uniform Real Estate
Contracts the property in question.

Within four months

thereafter the plaintiffs in the lower court case began
their action for adverse possession against the respondents but did not join appellant as a party defendant
until June 16, 1975.

Until then appellant did not know

that a lawsuit had been filed.

(Tr. pp. 51-52.)

When

appellant was served, respondents refused to take his
defense.

CTr. p. 52.)

Appellant was therefore separately

represented in the lower case action.

At the conclusion

of that case a judgment for plaintiffs was granted.

No

appeal was taken from that judgment.
Appellant in his answer also filed a cross complaint action against respondents and the hearing on that
claim was deferred by the court until after the judgment
for the plaintiffs was entered.

Shortly thereafter the

cross complaint of appellant against respondents was heard
by the court. At the time of the hearing of the cross
complaint, appellant was prepared to pay the remaining
amount due under the contracts, which amount could be
available within a day or two.

(Tr. pp. 52, 5 8.)

Judgment was entered for appellant based on the
-3-

theory of out-of-pocket loss.
difficulties with

Because of certain claimed

the judgment as prepared by respondents

and entered by the court, appellant made a timely objection to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgmentfwhich objections the lower court denied.

There-

after this appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE CROSSCOMPLAINANT DAMAGES FOR CROSS-DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF THE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS IN THE AMOUNT OF THE MARKET
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE OF THE BREACH LESS THE
AMOUNT REMAINING TO BE PAID ON THE CONTRACTS.
The court below determined that for vendorsrespondents1 breach of contract the purchaser-appellant
was entitled to damages under the out-of-pocket loss
rule, or the amount paid on the contract.

However, while

it is true that there is a division of authority as to
the appropriate measure of damages when it becomes impossible for a vendor to convey real property to a purchaser,
(see 48 ALR 19-24; 68 ALR 140-141), the clear position
of Utah is that in such situations the benefit of the
bargain rule applies to determine the measure of damages.
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Ut.2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) (hereinafte
Bunnell).

With regard to this rule this Court held in

Bunnell at 601:

-4-

The measure of damages where the vendor has
breached a land sale contract is the market
value of the property at the time of the
breach less the contract price to the vendor.
This formula for determining damages when the vendor fails to
convey property to the purchaser is the so-called "American"
rule.

10 Villanova Law Review 557 (1965).

It is the

rule in a good number of western jurisdictions, some of
them relying on Bunnell as authority.

Manson v. Manson,

529 P.2d 1343 (Colo. App. 1974) (citing Bunnell as authority)
Bennett v. Moring, 522 P.2d 741 (Colo. App. 1974); Aboud
v. Adams, 84 N.M. 683, 507 P.2d 430 (1973) (citing Bunnell
as authority); Conely v. Davidson, 35 N.M. 173, 291 P.
489 (1930); Freedman v. Cholick, 233 Or. 569, 379 P.2d
575 (1963); Crahane v. Swan, 212 Or. 143, 318 P.2d 942
(1957).

See also Williams v. Havens, 92 Ida. 439 444

P.2d 132 (1968); Higgins v. Belson, 66 Ida. 736, 168 P.2d
813 (1946).

In addition, many courts in other regions

have also adopted this rule.

92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser,

§ 592-593; Williston on Contracts § 1399 at 524 (3d ed.
1968) .
Some courts have suggested that recovery under
the benefit of the bargain rule requires a showing of
bad faith.

On the other hand, many courts have explicitly

or impliedly rejected any requirement of bad faith in
order for a vendee to recover the benefit of the bargain.
Indeed, none of the western jurisdictions cited above

-5-

require such a showing.

The reasons for not applying

a bad faith test are set out in Crahane v. Swan, supra
at 948-9, and paraphrased in 77 Am, Jur. 2d Vendor and
Purchaser, § 52 3:
The rule is well established that where the
vendor has title, and for any reason refuses
to convey it, as required by the terms of the
agreement, he shall respond in damages, and
make good to the vendee whatever he may have
lost by reason of the breach* So far as money
can do it, the vendee must be placed in the
same situation with regard to damages as if
the contract had been specifically performed;
and the measure of such damages will ordinarily
be the difference between the contract price
and the value of the property at the time of
the breach. This has always been regarded
as the true measure of damages in actions on
contracts for the future delivery of marketable
commodities, and it makes no difference in
principle whether the contract be for the sale
of real or personal property. In both instances
the vendee is entitled to have the thing agreed
for at the contract price, and to sell it himself at its increased value, and if it be
withheld the vendor should make good to him
the difference.
Nevertheless, even if Utah were to require
bad faith on the vendor's part in order to allow a purchaser
to recover the loss of the benefit of the bargain, because
of the facts in this case the appellant would still be
entitled to the market value of the land less the contract
price, (or if part of the contract price has been paid,
as was the circumstance in the instant case, the market
value of the property less the unpaid purchase money.
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 596.)

The rule of bad

faith in this type of case has been succinctly stated

-6-

in the California case of Shaw v. Union Escrow and Realty
Co., 53 Cal. App. 66, 200 P. 25, 26 (1921) when it was
announced:
It is not necessary in order to establish bad faith . . . that the vendor be
shown to have refused to go on with the
transaction because of some gain which
would have accrued to him. It is sufficient if he refuses to convey, where,
through his own negligence, he has put
it out of his power to fulfill the obligations of his contract. (emphasis added)
The California court then went on to characterize the
bad faith requirement as an anomaly stating that the
accepted rule was that a person is entitled to have in
damages the worth of that which would have been rendered
him under the full performance of the contract, Shaw v.
Union Escrow and Realty Co., supra.
In the instant case, respondents Connell, Boyce,
and Ehlers were negligent in allowing the plaintiff's
Smith to adversely possess the land in question.

The

fact that the property was adversely possessed is in and
of itself evidence of that negligence.

The requirements

of adverse possession are extremely difficult to meet.
Yet the lower court found with regard to those requirements that the taxes for the years 1952-1954, and 19591966 had been paid by the plaintiffs below and that those
plaintiffs had "exclusive, complete, actual, open,
notorious, hostile and continuous undisputed possession"
of the property in question.

(Findings of Fact and Con-
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elusions of Law.)

This could not have occurred in the

absence of negligence.
The conduct of respondents as borne out by their
testimony further shows their negligent management and
control of the property in question.

All three had ample

opportunity to verify payment of the taxes on said property , (Tr. p. 39) to inspect the property to determine
who was farming it, (Tr. pp. 45, 46) and to generally
review the conditions of the property.

Ehlers has held

title since 1949, and Boyce and Connell obtained control
of the late Mr. Pender's interest in the property in 196 3
(Tr. p. 37). It is undisputed that the property has been
farmed consistently either by plaintiffs or under plaintiffs1
control and direction during the entire time defendant
Connell, Boyce and Ehlers have held title to the same.
(Judgment and Decree.)

Nevertheless, there was never

once a demand made on the Smiths or those farming under
them for any kind of a lease payment or to cease and desist
their farming practices.

(Tr. p. 45)

On the other hand,

Warr purchased through a realtor and saw and purchased
the land in the fall at a time when it was difficult to
determine if the land was being farmed and if so by whom.
(Tr. pp. 46, 53-54)

Therefore, at the time of entering

into the contract the sellers had been in a position
for many years to make certain they had good title to
the land in question whereas the buyer was depending

-8-

entirely upon the sellers to give him good title.

That

the sellers cannot now give good title is a clear case
of negligence, or in other words, bad faith on their
part.

Hence even using the bad faith requirement, the

benefit of the bargain damage rule applies in this case.
POINT TWO
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION
OF THE AWARD UNDER THE OUT-OF-POCKET LOSS RULE.
It is appellant's position that this Court
is to be guided by the benefit of the bargain rule.
Nevertheless, if this Court were to adopt the out-of-pocket
loss rule as the lower court did, it should nevertheless
correct the errors made by the lower court in applying
that rule.
The court below gave judgment to the appellant
from respondent Ehlers for $4,442.65 but only $3,807.15
from respondents Connell and Boyce.
on Cross-Complaint.)

(Judgment and Decree

The clear testimony is that respondents

Connell and Boyce have been paid by appellant the sum
of $5,067.65.

(Tr. p. 48.)

Moreover, counsel for Boyce

and Connell in paragraph (8) of the response memo to
appellant's Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment Proposed stated that the basis for
the figure used in that judgment "was founded on information furnished cross-defendants by office or accountant
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for cross-plaintiffs, and in view of facts now available,
correctable,"

(Emphasis added,)

Therefore, the damages

should be increased by $1,260.50 if the out-of-pocket
loss rule is applied.
The judgment entered below provided no interest
from the dates of the payments by the appellant to the
respondents up to the date of judgment.

A fair amount

to be awarded appellant as interest on the amounts paid
would be 8 percent per annum.

Counsel for respondent

Ehlers and counsel for respondents Connell and Boyce,
in their responses to appellant's Objections to Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Proposed, both
admit that appellant is entitled to 6 percent from the
time of the payments until judgment.

It is submitted

that under the out-of-pocket loss rule appellant is
entitled to at least 6 percent interest from the date
of his payments up to the time of judgment.

In view

of current interest rates, however, a more appropriate
amount would be 8 percent.
With regard to other appellant's objections
to the court's rulings below, appellant directs the
Court to its Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment and Decree on Cross-complaint of
R. L. Warr which was filed below and which has been made
a part of the record on appeal.
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POINT THREE
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Under either theory of recovery, whether benefit of the bargain or out-of-pocket loss, appellant is
entitled to his attorney's fees.

The court below found

that the respondents were in breach of their Uniform
Real Estate Contracts under date of August 20, 1973,
"for their inability and failure to deliver possession
of the premises and their obvious inability to convey
title to the premises free and clear of all encumbrances."
The court below, however, denied the payment of attorney's
fees without any further explanation.
The contracts in question under paragraph 21
specifically provide for an attorney's fee if there
should be a default "in any of the covenants or agreements
contained herein."

That contract clause provides that

those fees "which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder
or by the statutes of the state of Utah whether such
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise" must
be paid by the defaulting party.

(Emphasis added.)

It

is clear and obvious that appellant, both in defending
the initial claim of adverse possession and further in
seeking recovery on his cross-complaint against respondents,
has incurred substantial attorney's fees which contractually must be paid for by the respondents.
-11-

POINT FOUR
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS COSTS OF COURT.
The court below in its judgment ordered that
each side was to bear its own costs*

The general rule

is, however, that the prevailing party, as a matter of
course, should normally be awarded its costs.
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 54(d)

Appellant was the

prevailing party below and there is no indication by the
court why it should not be awarded its costs.

Further,

again referring to paragraph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contracts in question, the respondents by contract agreed
to pay "all costs and expenses."
court costs.

This would include normal

Therefore, appellant is entitled to his

court costs.
CONCLUSION
Appellant contracted to buy a piece of property
from respondents which, except for the mismanagement and
lack of control over that property by respondents, would
have resulted in his having today a piece of property
worth much more than what he paid for it.
should not have to bear that loss.

Appellant

The loss is not specu-

lative, but rather, has been clearly testified to.

In

fact, the property in question has since been sold by the
plaintiffs.

This Court should therefore remand the case

to the lower court with an instruction that the lower
court is to award appellant damages based on the benefit
of the bargain rule and that the value of the property
-12-

is to be measured as of the time of the breach.
It would be manifest injustice to simply allow
only the out-of-pocket losses of appellant.

Even so,

if that is to be the rule, the lower court has not sufficiently provided for that loss and that amount should be
increased from $8,249.80 to $9,510.30. Further, there
would not be true restoration of out-of-pocket losses if
appellant were not entitled to interest from the time
of the payments until judgment at the rate of 8 percent
or, as a very minimum, at the rate of 6 percent.
Finally, appellant has been required to defend
the action against the lower court plaintiffs.

It further

became necessary to bring this action against the respondents . The contract which was signed clearly provides
for attorney's fees in such a case, whether this Court
adopts the benefit of the bargain rule or the out-ofpocket loss rule.

Therefore this case should also be

remanded to the lower court with an instruction that appellant is to be awarded his attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH C. RUST
DAVID A. WESTERBY
Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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